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Increasingly, organizations are pairing humans with AI systems to improve decision-making and reducing
costs. Proponents of human-centered AI argue that team performance can even further improve when the
AI model explains its recommendations. However, a careful analysis of existing literature reveals that prior
studies observed improvements due to explanations only when the AI, alone, outperformed both the human
and the best human-AI team. This raises an important question: can explanations lead to complementary
performance, i.e., with accuracy higher than both the human and the AI working alone?
We address this question by devising comprehensive studies on human-AI teaming, where participants solve
a task with help from an AI system without explanations and from one with varying types of AI explanation
support. We carefully controlled to ensure comparable human and AI accuracy across experiments on three
NLP datasets (two for sentiment analysis and one for question answering). While we found complementary
improvements from AI augmentation, they were not increased by state-of-the-art explanations compared to
simpler strategies, such as displaying the AI’s confidence. We show that explanations increase the chance
that humans will accept the AI’s recommendation regardless of whether the AI is correct. While this clarifies
the gains in team performance from explanations in prior work, it poses new challenges for human-centered
AI: how can we best design systems to produce complementary performance? Can we develop explanatory
approaches that help humans decide whether and when to trust AI input?
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Fig. 1. (Best viewed in color) Do AI explanations lead to complementary team performance? In a team setting,
when given an input, the human uses (usually imperfect) recommendations from an AI model to make the
final decision. We seek to understand if automatically generated explanations of the AI’s recommendation
improve team performance compared to baselines, such as simply providing the AI’s recommendation, R, and
confidence. (A) Most previous work concludes that explanations improve team performance (i.e., ∆A > 0);
however, it usually considers settings where AI systems are much more accurate than people and even the
human-AI team. (B) Our study considers settings where human and AI performance is comparable to allow
room for complementary improvement. We ask, “Do explanations help in this context, and how do they
compare to simple confidence-based strategies?” (Is ∆B > 0?).
Although the accuracy of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems is rapidly improving, in many
cases it remains risky for an AI to operate autonomously, e.g., in high-stakes domains or when
legal and ethical matters prohibit full autonomy. A viable strategy for these scenarios is to form
Human-AI teams, in which the AI system augments one or more humans by recommending its
predictions, but the people retains agency and have accountability on the final decisions. Examples
include AI systems that predict likely hospital-readmission to assist doctors with correlated care
decisions [5, 11, 65] and AIs that estimate recidivism to help judges decide whether to grant bail to
defendants [1, 25]. In such scenarios, the human-AI team is expected to perform better than either
would alone.
Many researchers have argued that such human-AI teams would be improved if the AI systems
could explain their reasoning. In addition to increasing trust between human and machine, and
between humans across the organization [27], one hopes that an explanation should help the
responsible human know when to trust the AI’s suggestion and when to be skeptical, e.g., when
the explanation doesn’t “make sense.” Such appropriate reliance [39] is crucial for users to leverage
AI assistance and improve task performance. Indeed, at first glance, it appears that researchers
have already confirmed the utility of explanations on tasks ranging from medical diagnosis [10, 47]
and data annotation [57] to deception detection [36]. In each case, the papers show that, when the
AI provides explanations, team accuracy reaches a level higher than human-alone.
However, a careful reading of these papers shows another commonality: in every situation, adding
humans to the team lowers performance compared to the AI working independently (Figure 1A &
Table 1). Explanations are shown to help raise team performance closer to that of the AI, but if pure
accuracy were the sole objective, one would achieve an even better result by stripping humans
from the loop and letting the AI operate autonomously. Thus, existing work suggests several
important open questions for the AI and HCI community: Do explanations provide complementary
performance (i.e., better than either the AI or the human alone) by enabling humans to anticipate
when the AI system is potentially wrong? Furthermore, do explanations provide significant value
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over simpler strategies such as displaying AI’s confidence in these situations? In the quest to build
the best human-machine organizations, such questions deserve critical attention.
To explore these questions, we conduct new studies where we control the study design such
that the AI’s accuracy is comparable to the human’s (Figure 1B). This decision aims at simulating
a setting where (i) there is a stronger incentive to deploy hybrid human-AI teams, and (ii) there
exists more potential for complementary performance.
We are especially interested in high-stakes tasks, such as medical diagnosis and recidivism
prediction. However, since conducting controlled studies on these domains is challenging and
ethically fraught, we started by selecting three common-sense tasks which can be tackled by crowd-
workers with little training: a set of LSAT questions that require logical reasoning, and sentiment
analysis of book and beer reviews. ) We measure human skill on these problems and then control
AI accuracy by purposely selecting study samples where AI has comparable accuracy. Among
AI-assisted conditions that displayed explanations, we varied the representation of explanations by
explaining just the predicted class versus explaining the top-two classes. We also introduced a novel
Adaptive Explanation mechanism, that switches between strategies based on the AI’s confidence, to
discourage blind agreement and achieve appropriate reliance. Since explanation quality is also a
likely factor in its effectiveness, and AI technology keeps improving, we also varied the source of
the explanations, considering those generated by state-of-the-art AI methods as well as by skilled
humans. In summary, our paper makes the following contributions:
• We highlight an important limitation of previous work on human-centered AI. While several
researchers have shown that automatically-generated explanations of AI predictions can
increase team performance (Table 1), these results are only shown for settings where the
AI system is significantly more accurate than the human partner and the human-AI team.
To our knowledge, no previous work has evaluated the effectiveness of AI explanations at
producing complementary performance, where the human-AI team outperforms both solo
human and AI.
• We develop an experimental setting to study human-AI complementary performance, and
conducted studies with 1626 users on three tasks, using a variety of explanation sources and
representations. We observed complementary performance on every task, but surprisingly,
explanations did not yield improved team performance, compared to simply showing the AI’s
confidence. Explanations increased team performance when the AI system was correct, but
decreased it when the AI erred — so the net value was minimal.
• Our novel Adaptive Explanationsmethod, which attempts to solve the problem of blind agree-
ment by reducing human trust when the AI has low confidence, failed to produce significant
improvement in final team performance over other explanation types, but there is suggestive
evidence that the adaptive approach is promising for high-quality explanations. Through
extensive qualitative analysis, we extract potential causes for the behavioral differences
among datasets, and summarize them as design implications.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
AI explanations are useful in many scenarios: communicating model predictions [17, 30, 33, 56],
teaching humans tasks like translation [48] or content moderation [28], augmenting human analysis
procedure [28] or creativity [14], legal imperatives [51, 64], and others. An assumption underlying
all these case is that a human will be in the loop, and thus some communication (e.g., an explanation)
is likely to benefit the overall process. As a result, various studies have evaluated the effect of
explanations from different dimensions, including whether the explanation improves users’ trust on
the AI [34, 68] or enables users to simulate the model predictions [13, 55], or assisting developers
to debug and train a better ML model [7, 30].
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Domain Task Performance
Metric Human alone AI alone Team Complementary?
Classification
Deceptive review [36] Accuracy ↑ 51.1% 87.0% 74.6% ✗
Deceptive review [35] Accuracy ↑ 60.4% 86.3% 74.0% ✗
Income category [70] Accuracy ↑ 65% 75% 73% ✗
Loan defaults [21] Norm. Brier ↑ 0 1 0.682 ✗
Hypoxemia risk [47] AUC ↑ 0.66 0.81 0.78 ✗
QA Quiz bowl [17] “AI outperforms top trivia players.” ✗
Regression House price [55] Avg. prediction error ↓ $331k $200k $232k ✗
Table 1. Categorization of recent studies that evaluate effect of automatically generated explanations on
human-AI team performance. While explanations did improve team accuracy, performance was not comple-
mentary — acting autonomously, the AI would have performed even better. For papers with multiple domains
or experiments, we took one sample with the most comparable human and AI performance.
In this paper, we focus explicitly on AI-assisted decision making scenarios [3], where an AI
assistant (e.g., a classification model) makes recommendations to a human (e.g., a judge), who is
responsible for making final decisions (e.g., whether or not to grant bail). In particular, we assess
performance in terms of the accuracy of the human-AI team. Intuitively, deploying such a human-
AI team is ideal if it achieves complementary performance, i.e., if it outperforms both the AI and
the human acting alone. AI-assisted decision making is often listed as a major motivation for AI
explanations. In recent years numerous papers have employed user studies to show that human
accuracy increases if the AI system explains its reasoning for tasks as diverse as medical diagnosis,
predicting loan defaults, and answering trivia questions [17, 21, 35, 36, 47, 55, 70]. However, as
summarized in Table 1, complementary performance was not observed in any of these studies – in
each case, adding the human to the loop decreased performance.
For example, in Lai et al. [35, 36], MTurk workers classified deceptive hotel reviews with predic-
tions from SVM and BERT-based models, as well as explanations in the form of inline-highlights.
However, models outperformed every team (see Table 1 and Figure 6 in [35]). Zhang et al. [70]
noticed the superior behavior of the models in Lai et al.’s work, and evaluated the accuracy and trust
calibration where the gap between human and the AI performances was less severe. Still, on their
task of income category prediction, their Gradient Boosted Trees model had 10% higher accuracy
compared to their MTurk workers, which seemed borderline “comparable” at best. Furthermore,
when run autonomously, their AI model performed just slightly better than the best team (see
Section 4.2.2 and Figure 10 in [70]). Similar performance trend is observed on tasks other than
classification. In Sangdeh et al. [55], MTurk workers predicted house price using various regression
models that generated explanations in terms of most salient features. Their models’ predictions
resulted in lowest error (See Figure 6 in [55]). In Feng et al. [17], experts and novices played Quiz
Bowl with recommendation from Elastic Search system. The system explained its predictions
by presenting training examples that were influential, and using inline-highlights to explain the
connection between question and evidence. Feng et al. do not report the exact performance of the
AI on their study sample, but mention its superiority in Section 3.1 in [17] pointing out that it
outperforms top trivia players.
While it is true that having the AI generate explanations led to a smaller drop in accuracy,
removing the human from the loop would have improved performance even more.
At least two potential causes account for the absence of complementary performance in these
cases. First, task design may have hindered collaboration: previous researchers considered AI
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systems whose accuracy was substantially higher than the human’s, leading to a small zone
of potential complementary performance (see Figure 1). This large gap between human and AI
performance made it more likely that human errors were a superset of the AI’s, reducing the
possibility of a human overseer spotting a machine mistake. Second, even when the task has the
potential for complementary performance, it is unclear if the collaboration mechanisms under
study supported it. For example, if the AI outputs a prediction with no measure of uncertainty, the
human may find it difficult to spot and understand potential AI mistakes (even if presented with an
explanation) and may therefore resort to less collaborative heuristics, such as “always trust the AI”
or “never trust the AI”.
To better understand the role of explanations in producing complementary performance, we
conducted user studies that address both of these potential causes by (1) enlarging the zone of
potential complementarity by controlling AI accuracy to match that of an average human,1 and
(2) carefully controlling collaboration mechanisms, including explanations and measures of AI
confidence.
3 DESIGN OF USER STUDIES
3.1 Tasks and Explanation Types
Since our interest is in AI-assisted decision making, we studied the effect of local explanations on
team performance – that is, explaining each individual recommendation made by a model [56]
rather than trying to provide a global understanding of the full model all at once (e.g., [38]).
We are motivated by high-stakes decisions, such as medical diagnosis, but were daunted by
the difficulty of running a large-scale randomized control trial in such a domain. Instead we
conducted crowd-sourced studies on Amazon Mechanical Turk and chose proxy domains that
required no specific background knowledge. We chose text classification because it is a popular
task in natural language processing (NLP) that has been used in several previous studies on
human-AI teaming [17, 24, 35, 43, 53, 70], requires little domain expertise, and is thus amenable to
crowdsourcing. Further, there are various explanation algorithms for classification, whose practical
benefits for team performance remain unclear. Specifically, we selected two sentiment analysis
datasets where specialized knowledge is not needed: beer reviews [6] and book reviews [50].
Explanations in this task are represented by saliency scores, where each input feature (i.e., each
word) is assigned a real number representing its contribution towards the prediction (positive
or negative). We display these explanations with inline-highlights, where the interface highlights
spans of text that are most salient to the model’s prediction directly in the input text, so the user
need not go back and forth between input and explanation [18, 36, 42, 62]. Figure 2 shows one
example beer review used in our study.
We also experimented with a more challenging task: Law School Admission Test (LSAT) ques-
tions2 where every question contains four options with a unique correct answer (Figure 3). An-
swering LSAT questions requires no specialized knowledge except common-sense reasoning skills,
such as recognizing logical connections and conflicts between arguments [69]. In this case it is
unclear how inline-highlights could be used to communicate logical constructs (e.g., contradiction
1Of course, complementary performance may be possible even in situations when one of the team partners is significantly
more accurate than the other. For example, a low-accuracy team member may be valuable if their errors are independent,
because they may be able to spot mistakes made by the teammajority. However, it is more difficult to observe complementary
performance in such settings, so we first consider the case where humans and AI have similar accuracy. If explanations
cannot provide value in such settings, it will be even more difficult to show complementary performance when teammates
have disparate skills.
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LawSchoolAdmissionTest
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: June 2020.
6 G. Bansal et al.
is not visible by highlighting the input alone); thus, we turned to narrative explanations which
justify a candidate answer in natural language (Section 3.5).
Admittedly, explanations can also be presented in other ways. For structured data, most studies
present the salient features, sometimes paired with importance weights [8, 21, 47, 52, 63]. On vision
tasks, some work takes the demonstrate-by-example approach, i.e., by explaining an example with
its closest match in the training set [48, 67]. These two methods are typically less suitable for
domains involving unstructured text, as the text features are sparser (i.e., a feature list can be
overwhelming) and are hard to parse (and therefore pairing with training examples is unfeasible).
3.2 Pilot Study on Sentiment Classification
To develop research strategies for the main study, we collected feedback about common explanation
approaches through a pilot study. The between-subject pilot study involved 150 crowd workers,
50 per condition, each of whom judged the sentiment of 50 beer reviews using assistance from
a logistic regression classifier (more details about the dataset is in Section 3.5). In all teaming
conditions, the model always presented at least its prediction and confidence.
Explanations. In some conditions, AI support was extended through the following explanations,
also common in previous work [21, 35]:
(1) Explain-Top-1 explains just the predicted class by highlighting the most influential words for
that class.
(2) Explain-Top-2 explains the top two predicted classes, and unlike Explain-Top-1, it also color-
codes and highlights words for the other sentiment value.
Observations. In contrast to many previous studies, we observed no significant changes or
improvements in aggregated team accuracy from displaying explanations. However, explaining just
the predicted class performed better than explaining both classes.
Additionally, when we analyzed performance, conditioning on whether the recommendation was
correct, we observed that explanations increased reliance on recommendations even when they were
incorrect. Explaining the predicted class slightly improved performance (compared to confidence
only) when the recommendation was correct but decreased performance when it was incorrect.
This is consistent with psychology literature [32], which has shown that human explanations cause
listeners to agree even when the explanation is wrong.
This effect was less pronounced when explaining both classes with Explain-Top-2, presumably
because it encouraged users to consider alternatives, deterring over-reliance. In Figure 2, for
example, if counter-argument (d) was not highlighted, participants could easily stop reading at the
highlighted first sentence and overlook the negative ending. These observations are consistent
with previous work in psychology which showed that when a person presented an explanation
for a proposition, listeners were more likely to think the proposition was true [32]. As a corollary,
when the model was correct, Explain-Top-1 was more effective than Explain-Top-2.
Finally, participants indicated that they wanted higher quality explanations. In particular, crowd-
workers were confused by situations where explanations did not seem to correlate with model
behavior or did not make intuitive sense.
3.3 Additional Explanation Strategies and Sources
Adaptive Explanations. The pilot study indicated that Explain-Top-2 was more beneficial than
Explain-Top-1 when the classifier made mistakes, but not otherwise. Relying on commonly seen
correlations between mistakes and low-confidence [26], we developed a new, dynamic strategy,
adaptive explanations, that switches between Explain-Top-1 and Explain-Top-2 depending on the
AI’s confidence. This method explains the top-two classes only when classifier confidence is below
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a threshold, explaining only the top prediction otherwise. Intuitively, the Adaptive explanation
method was inspired by an efficient assistant that divulges more information (confessing doubts
and arguing for alternatives) only when it is unsure about its recommendation. We test all three
strategies in our final studies.
Expert-Generated Explanations. Users in our pilot study were confused when explanations
did not make intuitive sense, due to either the quality of the underlying AI or the explanation proce-
dure. We compared a wide variety of NLP models and automatic explainers to find the most suitable
AI-generated explanations (details in Appendix A.1). However, we also added expert-generated
explanations to serve as an upper bound on explanation quality. For sentiment classification, one
author created expert explanations by selecting one short, convincing text phrase span for each class
(positive or negative). For LSAT , we found no automated method that could generate reasonable ex-
planations (unsurprising, given that explanations rely on prior knowledge and complex reasoning);
thus, we used expert explanations exclusively. The prep book from which we obtained our study
sample contained expert-written explanations for the correct answer, which one author condensed
to a maximum of two sentences. Additionally, since the book did not provide explanations for
alternate choices, we created these by manually crafting a logical supporting argument for each
choice that adhered to the tone and level of conciseness in the other explanations.
3.4 Hypotheses and Conditions
Informed by our pilot study, we formulated the following hypotheses for sentiment analysis:
H1 Among current AI explanation representations, explaining the predicted class will perform better
than explaining both classes.
H2 The better representation, Explain-Top-1, will still perform similarly to simply showing confidence.
H3 Our proposed representation with Adaptive explanations, which combines benefits of existing
representations, will improve performance.
H4 Adaptive explanations would perform even better if AI could generate higher quality explanations.
Since generating AI explanations for LSAT was not feasible (Section 3.3), we slightly modified
the hypothesis for LSAT : we omitted the hypothesis on explanation quality (H4) and tested the
first three hypotheses using expert- rather than AI-generated explanations.
Conditions. For both domains, we ran two baseline conditions: unassisted users (Human)
and simple AI assistance: showing the AI’s recommendation and confidence but no explanations
(Team (Conf)). All explanation conditions showed the AI’s confidence score, and we ran only
explanation conditions that were essential for testing our hypothesis. In the rest of the paper,
we indicate explanation conditions using the following template: Team (Strategy, Source). For
example, Team(Explain-Top-1, AI) indicates the condition that shows the AI’s explanations for the
top prediction.
Interface. Figure 2 shows an example UI for sentiment classification. In all explanation condi-
tions, explanations are displayed as inline highlights, with the background color aligned with the
positive/negative label buttons. The display for Team (Adaptive, AI) is similar to Figure 2 except for
that its use of AI-generated explanations, which in practice picked multiple short phrases instead of
a full sentence. In other conditions, only some of these cues are shown: in Team (Explain-Top-1, AI)
the counter-argument (d) is always missing, and in Team (Conf) no explanations are highlighted.
Figure 3 shows a screenshot of the user interface for LSAT in the Team (Adaptive, Expert) condition.
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b
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d
Fig. 2. A screenshot of the Team (Adaptive, Expert) condition for the Amzbook reviews dataset. Participants
read the review (left pane) and used the buttons (right pane) to decide if the review was mostly positive or
negative. The right pane also shows progress and accuracy (a). To make a recommendation, the AI (called
“Marvin”) hovers above a button (b) and displays the confidence score under the button. In this case, the AI
incorrectly recommended that this review was positive, with confidence 62.7%. As part of the explanation,
the AI highlighted the most positive sentence (c) in the same color as the positive button. Because confidence
was low, the AI also highlights the most negative sentence (d) to provide a counter-argument.
a
b
c
d
0 / 20
Fig. 3. A screenshot of Team (Adaptive, Expert) for LSAT . Similar to Figure 2, the interface contained
a progress indicator (a), AI recommendation (b), and explanations for the top-2 predictions (c and d). To
discourage participants from blindly following the AI, all AI information is displayed on the right.
3.5 AI Systems and Study Samples
Sentiment Classification. To prepare each dataset (Beer and Amzbook) for training classifica-
tion models, we binarized the target labels, split the dataset into training and test sets (80/20 split),
removed class imbalance from the train split by over-sampling the minority class, and further split
the training set to create a validation set.
To create our AI, for each dataset we fine-tuned a RoBERTa-based text classifier [45] on the
training dataset and performed hyper-parameter selection on the validation set. Explanations
from a combination of RoBERTa and LIME (a popular posthoc explainer [56]) were consistently
ranked the highest among the various systems we tried in an explainer comparison study (details
in Appendix A.1). Despite offering accurate predictions, RoBERTa generated poorly calibrated
confidence scores, a common issue with neural networks [22], which we mitigate with posthoc
calibration (isotonic regression [4]) on the validation set.
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For each domain, we selected 50 examples from the test set to create our study sample. To select
these examples, we first conducted additional pilot studies to establish accuracy of unassisted users,
which we observed were 87% for Beer and 85% for Amzbook3 We then selected 50 unambiguous
examples so that the AI’s accuracy was 84% (i.e., comparable to human accuracy), with equal false
positive and false negative rates.
For Adaptive explanations, we used the classifier’s median confidence as the threshold, which
was 89.2% for Beer and 88.9% for Amzbook. While one might learn a better threshold from data,
we leave that to future work. For each dataset, of the 50 total examples, the Adaptive explanation
condition explained 18 correctly predicted and 7 incorrectly predicted examples using Explain-Top-2
and explained the rest 25 using Explain-Top-1.
LSAT. We finetuned a RoBERTa model on ReClor data [69], which contains questions from
standardized exams like the LSAT and GMAT.4 For our study sample, we selected 20 examples from
an LSAT prep book [9]. We originally used questions from online practice exams, but our pilot
showed the potential for subjects to cheat by searching for answers on the Web. We verified that
our final questions were not easily searchable online, and were not included in the training dataset.
We selected fewer questions than we did for sentiment analysis because LSAT questions are more
time consuming to answer and could fatigue participants: LSAT questions took 57.4 ± 79.6 seconds
to answer compared to 16.6 ± 24.7 seconds for Beer and 18.5 ± 98.3 seconds for Amzbook. The
RoBERTa model achieved 65% accuracy on these examples, comparable to the 67% human accuracy
that we observed in our pilot study.
3.6 Study Procedure
Sentiment Classification. For the final study, participants went through the following steps: 1)
A landing page first explained the payment scheme; the classification task was presented (here, pre-
dicting the sentiment of reviews); and they were shown dataset-specific examples. 2) To familiarize
them with the task and verify their understanding, a screening phase required the participant to
correctly label four of six reviews [44]. Only participants who passed the gating test were allowed
to proceed to the main task. 3) The main task randomly assigned participants to one of our study
conditions (Section 3.3) and presented condition-specific instructions, including the meaning and
positioning of AI’s prediction, confidence, and explanations. Participants then labeled all 50 study
samples one-by-one. For a given dataset, all conditions used the same ordering of examples. 4) A
post-task survey was administered, asking whether they found the model assistance to be helpful,
their rating of the usefulness of explanations in particular (if they were present), and their strategy
for using model assistance.
We recruited participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), limiting the pool to subjects
from within the United States with a prior task approval rating of at least 97% and a minimum of
1,000 approved tasks. To ensure data quality, we removed data from participants whose median
labeling time was less than 2 seconds or those who assigned the same sentiment label to all examples.
We pre-registered this process based on our experiences with the pilot study. In total, we recruited
566 (Beer) and 552 (Amzbook) crowd workers, and in both datasets, 84% of participants passed the
screening and post-filtering. Eventually, we collected data from around 100 participants (ranging
from 93 to 101 due to filtering) per condition.
Workers received a base pay of $0.50 for participating, a performance-based bonus for the main
task, and a fixed bonus of $0.25 for completing the survey. Our performance-based bonus was a
3Again, each condition contained 50 crowdworkers. Together with LSAT , we estimated the human accuracy on the three
datasets with another 150 crowdworkers.
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GraduateManagementAdmissionTest
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combination of linear and step functions on accuracy: we gave $0.05 for every correct decision in
addition to an extra $0.50 if total accuracy exceeded 90% or $1.00 if accuracy exceeded 95%; we
assigned additional bonuses to motivate workers to strive for performance in the complementary
zone. Since we fixed the AI performance at 84%, humans could not obtain the bonus by blindly
following the AI’s recommendation. Participants spent 13 minutes on average on the experiment,
and received an average payment of $3.35 (equals an hourly wage of $15.77).
Modifications for LSAT. For the LSAT dataset, we used a very similar procedure but used two
screening questions and required workers to answer both correctly. We used a stricter passing
requirement to avoid low-quality workers who might cheat, which we observed more for this
task in our pilots. We again used MTurk with the same filters as sentiment classification, and we
posthoc removed data from participants whose median response time was less than three seconds.
508 crowd workers participated in our study, 35% of whom passed the screening and completed the
main task, resulting in a total of 100 participants per condition.
Workers received a base pay of $0.50 for participating, a performance-based bonus of $0.30 for
each correct answer in the main task, and a fixed bonus of $0.25 for completing an exit survey.
They received an additional bonus of $1.00, $2.00, and $3.00 for reaching an overall accuracy of 30%,
50%, and 85% to motivate workers to answer more questions correctly and not cheat. The average
completion time for the LSAT task was 16 minutes, with an average payment of $6.30 (equals an
hourly wage of $23.34).
4 RESULTS
4.1 Effect of Explanation on Team performance
Figure 4A shows team performance (i.e., accuracy of final decision) for each domain and condition.
We tested the significance of our results using Student’s T-tests with Bonferroni corrections.
The baseline teamcondition, Team (Conf), achieved complementary performance across
tasks. For example, for Beer , providing AI recommendations and confidence to users increased
their performance to (µ = 0.89 ± σ = 0.05), surpassing both AI accuracy (0.84) and unassisted
human accuracy (0.82 ± 0.09). Similarly, Team (Conf) achieved complementary performance for
Amzbook and LSAT , with relative gains of 2.2% and 20.1% over un-assisted participants (Figure 4A).
We did not observe a significant difference between Explain-Top-1 and Explain-Top-2,
or that H1 was not supported. For example, in Figure 4A of Beer , explaining the top prediction
performed marginally better than explaining the top-two predictions, but the difference was not
significant (z=0.85, p=.40). The same was true for Amzbook (z=0.81, p=.42) and LSAT (z=0.42, p=.68).
We did not observe significant improvements over the confidence baseline by display-
ing explanations. For example, for Beer , Team (Conf) and Team (Explain-Top-1, AI) achieved
similar performance, with the accuracy being 0.89 ± 0.05 vs. 0.88 ± 0.06 respectively; the difference
was insignificant (z=-1.18, p=.24). We observed the same pattern for Amzbook (z=1.23, p=.22) and
LSAT (z=0.427, p=.64). As a result, we could not reject our hypothesis H2 that Explain-Top-1
performs similar to simply showing confidence . This result motivates the need to develop new AI
systems and explanation methods that provide true value to team performance by supplementing
the model’s confidence, perhaps working in tandem with confidence scores.
Though the third explanation strategy was designed to alleviate the limitations of Explain-
Top-1 and Explain-Top-2 in our experiments, we did not observe improvements from using
Adaptive explanations. For example, we did not observe any significant differences between
Team (Adaptive, AI) and Team (Conf) for Beer (z=-1.02, p=.31) or Amzbook (z=1.08, p=.28). We
did not observe significant differences between Team (Adaptive, Expert) and Team (Conf) for
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Fig. 4. Team performance (with average accuracy and 95% confidence interval) achieved by different explana-
tion conditions and baselines for three datasets, with around 100 participants per condition. (A) Across every
dataset, all team conditions achieved complementary performance. However, we did not observe significant
improvements from using explanations over simply showing confidence scores. (B) Splitting the analysis
based on the correctness of AI accuracy, we saw that for Beer and LSAT , Explain-Top-1 explanations worsened
performance when the AI was incorrect, the impact of Explain-Top-1 and Explain-Top-2 explanations were
correlated with the correctness of the AI’s recommendation, and Adaptive explanations seemed to have
the potential to improve Explain-Top-1 when the AI was incorrect, and to retain the higher performance of
Explain-Top-1 when the AI was correct.
LSAT (z=0.16, p=.87). More surprisingly, switching the source of Adaptive explanations to expert-
generated did not significantly improve sentiment analysis results. For example, in Figure 4A,
the differences in performance between Team (Adaptive, Expert) and Team (Adaptive, AI) were
insignificant: Beer (z=1.31, p=.19) and Amzbook (z=-0.78, p=.43). As a result, we could not reject the
null hypotheses for either H3 or H4.
While Adaptive explanations did not significantly improve team performance across
domains, further analysismaypoint away forward by combining the strengths of Explain-
Top-1 and Explain-Top-2. Considering team performance split by whether the AI made a mistake
(Figure 4B), we observe that explaining the top prediction lead to better accuracy when the AI
recommendation was correct but worse when the AI was incorrect, as in our pilot study. Consistent
with our intuition, for Beer , Adaptive explanations improved performance over Explain-Top-1
when the AI was incorrect and improved performance over Explain-Top-2 when the AI was correct,
although the effect was smaller on other datasets.
While Figure 4B shows team performance, the promising effects of Adaptive explanations are
clearer if we study the agreement between AI predictions and human decisions (Figure 5). Adaptive
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Fig. 5. Relative agreement rates between humans and AI (i.e., does the final human decision match the AI’s
suggestion?) for various conditions, with examples split by whether AI’s confidence exceeded the threshold
used for Adaptive explanations. Across the three datasets, Adaptive explanations successfully reduced the
human’s tendency to blindly trust the AI when it was uncertain and more likely to be incorrect. For example,
comparing Team (Explain-Top-1, AI) and Team (Adaptive, AI) on low confidence examples that did not pass
the threshold (rectangles), participants in Explain-Top-2 (pink rectangles) were less likely to agree with the
AI compared to those who saw Explain-Top-1 (blue rectangles). Note that the display (color encoded) is
determined by the conditions on the y-axis.
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Fig. 6. The distribution of study examples as a function of average human accuracy. For each domain,
examples on the right were easy for most humans working alone. Both Beer and LSAT show a distribution
that shows potential for complementary team performance: humans can correct easy questions mistaken
by the AI (red bars towards the right), and, conversely, the AI may add value on examples where humans
frequently err (green bars towards the left). In contrast, Amzbook showed less potential for this kind of
human-AI synergy, with less “easy for human” questions (bars towards the left).
explanations seem to encourage participants to consider the AI more when it is confident and
solve the task themselves otherwise. Unfortunately, as our experiments show, the effect of using
Adaptive did not seem sufficient to increase final team accuracy, possibly for two reasons: (1) in
high confidence regions (circles in Figure 5), not only did workers have to agree more, but they also
had to identify cases where the model failed with very high confidence (unknown unknowns [37]).
Identifying unknown unknowns could have been a difficult and time-consuming task for workers,
and they may have needed other types of support that we did not provide. (2) In low confidence
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regions (rectangles), not only did workers have to disagree more, but they also had to be able to
solve the task correctly when they disagreed. Explain-Top-2 explanations might have enabled them
to suspect the model more, but it is unclear if they helped participants make the right decisions.
This indicates that more sophisticated strategies are needed to support humans in both situations.
Differences in expertise To understand how differences in expertise between humans and the AI
impacts team performance, we computed the average unassisted-user accuracy on study examples
and overlayed the AI’s expertise (whether the recommendation was correct) in Figure 6. The figure
helps explain why users benefited more from AI recommendations for both Beer and LSAT datasets.
There was a significant fraction of examples that the AI predicted correctly but humans struggled
with (green bars to the left), while the same was not true for Amzbook (where AI recommendations
did not help as much). Further, when the AI was incorrect, explaining predictions on Amzbook via
Explain-Top-1 improved performance by 5% over showing confidence (Figure 4B), but it decreased
performance for Beer and LSAT . One hypothesis that explains this observation is that most AI
mistakes were predicted correctly by most humans on Amzbook (red bars were mostly towards the
right). After observing clear model mistakes, participants may have learned to rely on them less,
despite the convincing-effect of explanation. This pattern was more visible in participants’ self-
reported collaboration approaches – Amzbook participants reportedly ignored the AI’s assistance
the most (Section 4.3).
4.2 Survey Responses on Likert ScaleQuestions
Two of the questions in our post-task survey requested categorical ratings of AI and explanation
usefulness. While participants generally rated AI assistance useful across datasets (Figure 7A),
the improvements in ratings between most explanations and simply showing confidence were
marginal. The difference was more clear for high-quality adaptive explanations; e.g., for Beer , 70%
of participants rated AI assistance useful with Team (Adaptive, Expert) in contrast to 57% with
Team (Conf). We observed a similar pattern on Amzbook (65% vs. 49%) and LSAT (63% vs. 45%),
though on LSAT , Team (Explain-Top-2, Expert) received slightly higher ratings than Team (Adaptive,
Expert) (66% vs. 63%). Figure 7B shows that participants’ ratings for usefulness of explanations
were lower than the overall usefulness of AI’s assistance (in A). Again, expert-generated Adaptive
explanations received higher ratings than AI-generated ones for Beer (53% vs. 38%) vs.Amzbook (50%
vs. 40%). This could indicate that showing higher quality explanations improves users’ perceived
helpfulness of the system.
4.3 Qualitative Coding of Collaboration Approach
To better understand how users collaborated with the AI in different tasks, we coded their response
to the prompt: “Describe how you used the information Marvin (the AI) provided.” Two annotators
independently read a subset of the responses to identify emergent codes and, using a discussion
period, created a codebook (Table 2). Using this codebook, for each team condition and dataset,
they coded a total of 30 random responses: 28 were unique and 2 overlapped between annotators,
allowing us to compute inter-annotator agreement. Our final analysis used 409 unique responses
after removing 11 responses deemed to be of poor quality (Table 2). We scored the inter-annotator
agreement with both the Cohen’sκ and the raw overlap between the coding.We achieved reasonably
high agreements, with an average µ(κ) = 0.71,σ (κ) = 0.18 (the average agreement was 93%± 6.5%).
We noticed the following, which echo the performance differences observed across datasets:
Most participants used the AI’s recommendation as a prior or to double-check their
answers. For all datasets, more than 70% of participants mentioned they would partially take AI’s
recommendation into consideration rather than blindly following AI or fully ignoring it (Figure 8).
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Fig. 7. Analysis of participant response to two statements: (A) “AI’s assistance (e.g., the information it dis-
played) helped me solve the task”, and (B) “AIâĂŹs explanations in particular helped me solve the task.” Across
datasets, a majority of participants found AI assistant to be useful, and they rated all the conditions similarly,
with a slight preference towards Team (Adaptive, Expert). In contrast to AI’s overall usefulness, fewer partici-
pants rated explanations as useful, particularly Explain-Top-2 explanations across sentiment classification
datasets. Participants also had a clearer preference for higher-quality (expert) Adaptive explanations.
Participants used the AI as a prior guide more than as a post-check for sentiment analysis, but
not for LSAT , which aligns with our interface design: for LSAT , AI recommendations were on a
separate pane, encouraging users to solve the task on their own before consulting the AI.
Participants ignored the AI more on domains where AI expertise did not supplement
their expertise. Figure 8 shows that while only 11% of LSAT participants claimed that they mostly
ignored the AI, the ratio doubled (Beer , 23%) or even tripled (Amzbook, 30%) for sentiment analysis.
As discussed in Figure 6, this may be due to correlation differences between human and AI errors
for different datasets: Amzbook participants were less likely to see cases where AI was more correct
than they were, and therefore they may have learned to rely less on it. For example, one participant
in Amzbook mentioned, “I had initially tried to take Marvin’s advice into account for a few rounds,
and stopped after I got 2 incorrect answers. After that I read all of the reviews carefully and followed
my own discretion.”
In contrast, a Beer participant relied more on the AI once realizing it could be correct: “At first I
tried reading the passages and making my own judgments, but then I got several items wrong. After
that, I just switched to going with Marvin’s recommendation every time.”
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Codes Definitions and Examples #Participants
Overall Collaboration Approach (codes are mutually exclusive)
Mostly Follow AI The participant mostly followed the AI.
“I went with Marvin most times.”
23 (6%)
AI as Prior Guide Used AI as a starting reference point.
“I looked at his prediction and then I read the passage.”
190 (47%)
AI as Post Check Double-checked after they made their own decisions.
“I ignored it until I made my decision and then verified what it said.”
102 (25%)
Mostly Ignore AI Mostly made their own decisions without the AI.
“I didn’t. I figured out the paragraph for myself.”
90 (22%)
The Usage of Explanation (codes can overlap)
Used Expl. Explicitly acknowledged they used the explanation.
“I skimmed his highlighted words.”
138 (42%)
Speed Read Used explanations to quickly skim through the example.
“I looked at Marvin’s review initially then speed read the review. ”
29 (9%)
Validate AI Used the explanation to validate AI’s reasoning.
“Marvin focuses on the wrong points at times. This made me
cautious when taking Marvin’s advice.”
17 (5%)
The Usage of Confidence (codes can overlap)
Used Conf. Explicitly acknowledged they used the confidence.
“I mostly relied on Marvin’s confident levels to guide me.”
90 (22%)
Conf. Threshold Was more likely to accept AI above the threshold.
“If Marvin was above 85% confidence, I took his word for it.”
24 (6%)
Others (codes can overlap)
Fall Back to AI Followed the AI’s label if they failed to decide.
“i used it if i was unsure of my own decision.”
54 (13%)
Updated Strategy Changed their strategy as they interacted more.
“I decided myself after seeing that sometimes Marvin failed me. ”
12 (2%)
Table 2. The codebook for participants’ descriptions of how they used the AI, with the number of self-reports.
In addition to the user’s collaboration behavior, these differences between domains may have
affected our quantitative observations of team performance. For example, a small difference between
human and AI expertise (distribution of errors) means that the improvements in performance when
the AI is correct would be less substantial. In fact, in Figure 4B, if we compare the team performance
when the AI is correct, the difference between team conditions and the human baseline is least
substantial for Amzbook.
Some participants developed mental models of the AI’s confidence score to determine
when to trust the AI.Among participants who mentioned they used confidence scores (90 in total),
27% reported using an explicit confidence threshold, below which they were likely to distrust the AI.
The threshold mostly varied between 80 to 100 (83 ± 8 for Beer , 89 ± 7 for Amzbook, and 90 ± 0 for
LSAT ) but could go as low as 65, indicating that different users built different mental models about
when they considered AI to be “trustworthy.” Furthermore, some participants consigned the
task to AI when they were themselves uncertain. For example, 13% participants mentioned
that they would go with the AI’s decision if they were on the fence by themselves: “There were
some that I could go either way on, and I went with what Marvin suggested.”
These user behaviors are similar to observations in psychology literature on Truth-Default
Theory [41], which shows that people exhibit truth-default behavior: by default people are biased to
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Fig. 9. On comparing the occurrence of the code “Used Conf.” in just the confidence condition and in those
with explanations, we saw a similar proportion of participants that explicitly acknowledged using confidence,
regardless of whether they saw an explanation.
assume that the speaker is being truthful, especially when triggers that raise suspicion are absent.
Furthermore, our participants’ distrust in low-confidence recommendations is also consistent with
examples of triggers that cause people to abandon the truth-default behavior.
Note that across all three domains, the same proportion of participants self-reported using
AI’s confidence scores regardless of whether they saw explanations (Figure 9). This indicates that
confidence is the primary information that people use to collaborate with AI agents.
Explanations can help participants validate theAI’s decisions, and the inline-highlight
format helped participants speed up their decision making. Among the participants who
explicitly mentioned using explanations, 27% in Beer and 32% in Amzbook reported that they
used inline-highlight explanations to read review text faster. Since LSAT explanations required
reading additional text, we did not expect LSAT users to find this benefit. Interestingly, for Beer
and Amzbook, while a small percentage of users (17%) reported using the explanations to validate
the AI’s decisions (see Figure 2), only 2% did so in LSAT . This could be because LSAT is a harder
task than sentiment analysis, and verifying AI’s explanations is costlier. Other participants mostly
mentioned that they would supplement their own reasoning with the AI’s: “I read the Marvin
rationale and weighed it against my intuition and understanding.”
5 DISCUSSION & DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Increasingly, we see organizations incorporating AI systems into the work process to automate
routine tasks and advise human decision makers on higher stake decisions, such as medical di-
agnosis [11, 31], wildlife protection [19], improving housing for homeless youth [12, 29], and
recidivism prediction [23, 25, 60]. While there are many motivations for creating these human-AI
teams, a primary one is increasing the effectiveness of decision making, while reducing the cost of
operations. But increased use of AI brings several well-known dangers as well, including bias and
erratic behavior [64]. Many researchers have argued that if AI could explain its reasoning, these
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dangers would be reduced and the resulting socio-technical system might make consistent and
accurate decisions.
We investigate this motivation, by evaluating the impact of AI explanations on team performance
for the case when humans have comparable accuracy to their AI teammates. Though conducted
in a limited scope (Section 5.1), we believe our findings provide informative insights into future
work. In this section, we reflect on our study through an overview, and then provide more detailed
observations that may guide the design of future explanation techniques and further experiments.
To our surprise, the simple approach of showing the AI’s confidence worked as well as any
of the actual explanations strategies that we considered. The use of explanations increased the
human’s blind trust in the AI system, rather than appropriate reliance [39], making them more
likely to adopt its recommendation both when the AI was right and when it was wrong. While
this is consistent with the psychology literature [32], which has shown that human explanations
cause listeners to agree even when the explanation is wrong, we believe the phenomenon has not
previously been noted with AI-generated explanations.
Our observation raises the question “What is the purpose of including a human in the loop?” We
have chosen to focus on complementary performance, where adding a human improves accuracy
beyond what either human or AI could achieve alone; but in other contexts, a human may be
required for important and essential moral or legal reasons. In these contexts, we question if the
purpose of an explanation is simply to soothe the human, making them more compliant so they
are more likely to blindly agree with the computer, which seems unsatisfactory. Compared to the
widely adopted strategy of outputting the strongest convincing evidence for every class, we believe
explanations that properly raise doubts may be even more important (Section 5.3).
Our Adaptive Explanation is aimed at enabling and improving human oversight by encouraging
the human to think more carefully when the system has low confidence. While the relative agree-
ment rates show promise (Figure 5), the method was not sufficient to significantly increase the final
team accuracy (Figure 4). Further analyses on the dataset distribution differences and participants’
self-reported collaboration approaches point out that (1) developers of human-AI teaming tools
should assess the complementarity between the AI and the human beyond just looking at their solo
performances (Section 5.2), and (2) researchers studying human-AI collaboration should explore
alternative collaboration architectures (Section 5.3).
5.1 Limitations
We focused solely on the use of explanations to improve the accuracy of human-AI teams. As
mentioned before, AI explanations have other motivations not addressed by this paper, such as
debugging AI output [56], teaching [48], satisfying legal requirements [64], and increasing trust
between sub-organizations [27]. We also did not explore benefits from explanations on metrics
besides accuracy, such as increasing speed as reported by some users in Section 4.2. Further, because
it is so challenging to run large-scale experiments on high-stakes domains, such as medical diagnosis,
with hard to locate, expert users, we restricted ourselves to tasks amenable to crowdsourcing (text
classification and question answering). While our results may not generalize to high stakes domains,
we believe our large-scale study provides informative insights that will inform future work on
these domains. Finally, we only explored a small fraction of possible ways to present explanations:
highlighting key words [18, 36, 42, 62] and natural language arguments. It may be that alternative
approaches provide more benefit to team performance.
5.2 When to collaborate?
Comparable accuracy does not guarantee complementary partners. In some of our experiment
domains, AI errors correlated much more strongly with humans’ than in others. For example,
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consider the top row of Figure 4B for Beer , where there is an inverse correlation — humans did
worse on the problems that AI got correct than problems on which the AI was incorrect. For the
Amzbook domain, however, the situation was reversed — both human and AI found the same
problems hard or easy. It should not be surprising, then, that the benefit of AI assistance proved
much greater for Beer than for Amzbook: by bringing different “perspectives” the two teammates
skills were more complementary.5 This suggests that, a comparable accuracy between the human
and AI is not sufficient for creating a team with complementary performance. Rather, in an ideal
team, the human and AI would have minimally overlapping mistakes so that their is a greater
opportunity to correct each other’s mistakes. As some recent work has suggested [2, 66], in some
cases it may be useful to directly optimize for complementary behavior instead of automation
accuracy. Models that are trained to make errors when the human is correct are more likely to
benefit from human interventions on those errors, and therefore are likely to achieve a more
complementary team performance.
The definition of “complementarity” can go beyond accuracy. Our work, as well as those in Table 1,
evaluated team performance along one dimension: accuracy of decisions. In general, one may wish
to achieve complementary performance on a multi-dimensional metric. For example, when grading
programming exercises with an AI [20], the teammay wish to balance several metrics, such as speed
of grading, precision of error discovery, and quality of feedback. To achieve this, the human and AI
could maximize their talents in more than one dimensions: AI could use its computation power to
quickly gather statistics and highlight commonly missed corner cases, whereas the human teacher
could focus on ranking the intelligence of the student’s proposed algorithms. In fact, research
shows that large collaborative communities such as Wikipedia require AI systems that balance
multiple aspects such as reducing human effort, improving trust and positive engagement [58].
We encourage future researchers to extend the definition of complementarity, and to evaluate the
impact of explanations on those dimensions accordingly.
5.3 How to collaborate?
Complementarity requires more than a shift in agreement. Our Adaptive explanation reduced
user tendency to blindly trust the AI, yet its impact on the team accuracy was less observable.
This highlights that complementary performance requires more than simple changes in agreement
between the human and AI. As mentioned in Section 4.1, we note: (1) when the model is confident,
not only should workers agree more, but they also have to identify cases where the model fails
with high confidence (unknown unknowns [37]). (2) When the model is not confident, not only
should workers disagree more, but they also have to solve the task correctly once they discern that
AI is wrong. The Explain-Top-2 explanations might cue them to suspect the model’s veracity, but it
is unclear if those explanations can help participants make the correct final decision.
Explanations should be informative, instead of just convincing. A followup question is, then, what
kinds of interactions would help the humans identify unknown-unknowns, or perform correctly
when the AI is incorrect?
Strategy-wise, while our current Adaptive explanations change based on the AI’s confidence,
it may be possible to design different explanation strategies that adapt based on the frequency
of agreement between the human and AI. For example, instead of explaining why it believes an
answer to be true, the AI might play a devil’s advocate role, explaining its doubts — even when it
agrees with the human.
5Because the LSAT problems were so difficult, there was also more potential for complementary performance, and patterns
in this domain resemble those of Beer .
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Source-wise, our current expert explanations did not help more than the AI explanations, which
may indicate that maximally convincing explanations — a common objective shared in the design
of many AI explanation algorithms — might be a poor choice for complementary performance.
Indeed, while it is known that human explainers and listeners often have different objectives [46],
it seems quite problematic to develop AI systems that actively seek to minimize human oversight.
A more ideal condition might be to reflect the AI’s correctness directly through the explanation,
such that the explanation makes sense when the recommendation is correct, but is irrelevant,
nonsensical and raises suspicion when it is incorrect. We thought that this might happen with
our RoBERTa-based explanations for sentiment analysis, but informal analysis showed that the
AI usually found some plausible justification when it made mistakes. We hope future research
can produce explanation algorithms that are more capable of generating informative explanations,
which better enable the human to effectively check an AI’s reasoning and catch its mistakes.
The timing of AI recommendations is important. Besides the types of explanations, it is also
important to carefully designwhen the AI provides its viewpoint. All of ourmethods used aworkflow
that showed the AI’s prediction (and its explanation) to the human, before they attempted to solve
the problem on their own. However, by presenting an answer and accompanying justification
upfront, and perhaps overlaid right onto the instance, our design makes it almost impossible for
the human to reason independently, ignoring the AI’s opinion while considering the task. This
approach risks invoking the anchor effect, studied in Psychology [16] — people rely heavily on the
first information that is presented by others when making decisions. This effect was reflected in an
increase in the use of the “AI as Prior Guide” collaboration approach in the sentiment analysis
domains, compared to LSAT (Figure 8).
Alternate approaches that present AI recommendations in an asynchronous fashion might
increase independence and improve accuracy. For example, pairing the humans with slower AIs
(that take more time to make recommendation) may provide the humans with a better chance to
reflect on their own decisions [54]. Methods that embody management-science recommendations
for avoiding group-think [49] might also be effective, e.g., showing the AI’s prediction after the
human’s initial answer or only having the AI present an explanation if it disagreed with the human’s
choice. We note that these approaches correspond to the Update and Feedback methods of Green
& Chen [21], which were effective, albeit not in the complementary zone. However, by delaying
display of the AI’s input until after the human has solved the task independently, one may preclude
improvement to the speed of problem-solving, which often correlates to the cost of performing
the task (participants self-reported that explanations, in particular the inline-highlights, helped
them speed up their reading). There is a strong tension between competing objectives of speed,
accuracy, and independence; We see our paper as a call to action, and encourage the field to design
and conduct experiments in similar complementary settings, and explore different architectures for
balancing these factors.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Previous work has shown that the accuracy of a human-AI team can be improved when the AI
explains its suggestions, but these results are only obtained in situations where the AI, operating
independently, is better than either the human or the best human-AI team.We ask if AI explanations
help achieve complementary team performance, i.e. whether the team is more accurate than either
the AI or human acting independently. We conducted large-scale experiments on three datasets
with more than 1500 participants. Importantly, we selected our study questions to ensure that
our AI systems had accuracy comparable to humans and increased the opportunity for seeing
complementary performance. We considered multiple explanation strategies: explaining the top
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prediction, the top two predictions, and a novel adaptive explanation that explains alternative
answers if AI’s confidence is low. Furthermore, we tested explanations from two sources: those
generated by LIME on a state-of-the-art RoBERTa model and those produced by a human expert.
While all human-AI teams showed complementary performance, none of the explanation condi-
tions produced accuracy significantly higher than the simple baseline of showing the AI’s confidence.
Explanations increased team performance when the system was correct, but they decreased ac-
curacy on examples when the system was wrong. In short, the use of explanations increased the
human’s blind trust in the AI system, rather than appropriate reliance [39], making them more
likely to adopt its recommendation both when the AI was right and when it was wrong. This
is consistent with psychology literature [32], which has shown that human explanations cause
listeners to agree even when the explanation is wrong, but to our knowledge this hasn’t been
shown for AI explanations. While several prior studies’ results showed net team improvement from
explanations, their AI was so much more accurate than the humans that indiscriminate trust in AI
appeared to be desirable. The result also shows the importance of investigating complementary
performance.
Our work highlights critical challenges for the HCI and AI communities: characterize when
human-AI collaboration can be beneficial (i.e., when both parties complement each other), develop
explanation approaches and coordination strategies that result in a complementary team perfor-
mance that exceeds what can be produced by simply showing AI’s confidence, and communicate
explanations to increase understanding rather than just to persuade. As a first step, we analyzed
the weaknesses of existing explanation representations and developed adaptive explanations, which
change the representation based on the AI’s confidence. While we did not observe significant
improvements with these conditions, we saw suggestive evidence, in several datasets, that Adaptive
explanation approach has the potential to achieve appropriate reliance [39] — increase trust for
high confidence predictions yet encourage autonomy when the AI might be wrong.
Through extensive qualitative analysis, we characterized the connection between improved team
performance and the correlation of errors between the human and AI system. For example, in the
Beer and LSAT domains, humans did poorly on problems that the AI answered correctly while
many problems that stumped the AI were easy for most humans (Figure 6). In these domains, there
was both increased complementarity and more benefit from AI recommendations than Amzbook,
where human and AI expertise were more correlated. This suggests that the benefit of AI assistance
may be much more complex than mere accuracy, and that it may be useful to directly optimize for
complementary behavior as suggested by recent work [2, 66]
We hope this paper will serve as a “Call to action” for the HCI and AI communities, as there is
much future work remaining to be done. At the highest level, we hope researchers can develop new
interaction methods that increase complementary performance beyond having an AI telegraph
its confidence. We considered accuracy as the primary performance metric, but we hope to inves-
tigate other measures as well, such as time required to complete a task and human satisfaction.
Even in the context of improving accuracy, it seems as if there are additional factors that should
be investigated, such as the correlation between human and machine errors. Different ways of
presenting explanations, e.g., besides our highlights and narrative explanations, may also yield
different results. Additionally, one should consider different workflows — our design essentially
has humans double-checking the AI’s recommendation, the opposite flow might work better. For
example, Green and Chen showed benefit to a Feedback condition, where the AI only volunteered
its opinion after the human completed the task independently [21]; perhaps this approach offers
benefit in the setting of complementary performance? We also hope to develop improved versions
of our Adaptive explanation, which may improve accuracy by fostering appropriate reliance.
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Fig. 10. Among the many approaches we tried, roBERTA+LIME was consistently ranked higher than others.
roBERTa+LIME appeared to be most highly scored (3.96 ± 1.2).
A APPENDIX
A.1 Choosing a Classification Model & Explanation Method
While various studies have been conducted to compare explanations from different aspects (e.g.. [24,
53]), there has yet to be a clear conclusion on which models/explainers perform the best. For
our studies, we wished to select a model that offered both credible predictions and explanations.
So, we compared three approaches, which broadly covered existing NLP models for generating
explanations along with predictions [43, 53]: an intelligible model (Logistic Regression classifier),
a encoder-decoder rationale generator (Lei et al. [40]), and a recent contextual embedding-based
model (RoBERTa with linear classification layer). While the first two models inherently generate
explanations by providing access to weight vectors which represent salience of input words for
predictions, the third method is a black-box and requires using a post-hoc explainer to generate
explanations. We tried three existing post-hoc explainers to explain the RoBERTamodel: LIME trains
a new intelligible model to provide a local approximation of a model’s behavior[56], SimpleGrad
computes gradients with respect to input, and IntergratedGrad uses an approach that aggregates
multiple gradients [59].6
We conducted the following small study on Beer to select a model for both datasets: We selected
ten beer reviews (five positive and negative) on which all three models were correct and analyzed
explanations for the predicted class (highlighted similar to our main task). Since we experimented
with three explainers for RoBERTa, we analyzed five explanations per example. Then, we asked
ten graduate students in computer science to rank the explainers from the best quality (score 5)
to the worst (score 1). Specifically, we asked them to “rank the explainers by quality, i.e., which
explainer picks the most reasonable words associated with predicted positive/negative sentiment.” All
explanations were anonymized and randomly ordered.
For our main task, we selected the setting that received the highest average score across partici-
pants and reviews, which was roBERTa+LIME (Figure 10).
A.2 Stratified Sampling Using Classifier’s Confidence
Despite performing calibration, our roBERTa model produced a highly skewed distribution of
confidence scores (Figure 10A). For example, a large number of test examples had a confidence score
greater than 0.99, which is problematic for our studies. If all (or most) samples have a confidence
score greater than 0.99, then showing confidence scores to users is essentially uninformative. Since
a uniformly randomly drawn study sample would inherit a similar skew, we performed stratified
sampling.
6Implementation: For logistic regression we used scikit-learn, for the rational generator we used re-implementaion by
[15], and, we used AllenNLP’s demo code for classification using RoBERTa https://demo.allennlp.org/sentiment-analysis.
For the post-hoc explainers, we used LIME’s original implementation [56] and AllenNLP Interpret [61] for gradient-based
explainers.
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Fig. 11. A comparison of the confidence distribution, before and after stratified sampling. The sampling
helped select examples to achieve a controlled confidence distribution needed for our analysis.
To select examples with a wide range of confidence scores, we first sampled examples such that
0.5 ≤ confidence < 0.99, and binned them with a step size of 0.1 (Figure 11A). We then performed
stratified sampling to draw examples from sub-populations defined by a confidence bin and category
of AI prediction: True Positive, True Negative, False Positive, and False Negative. Since drawing
equal number of samples for each sub-population may be too unnatural, for each confidence bin in
a prediction category, we drew samples proportional to the logarithmic of number of samples in
that bin. Let nc,p denote number of samples in confidence bin c with prediction category p. We
drewmc,p samples such that:
mc,p =
ln(nc,p )∑
c ′(ln(nc ′,p ))
· n∗,p
As shown in Figure 11A, our sampling helped to construct a subset with a reasonable number of
examples per bin, with different AI predictions.
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